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NATO’S NEW ROLE
ussia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine have been momentous in their con-
sequences for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)� Moscow 
has instilled new life in the almost seventy-year-old alliance� Doubts about its 
relevance and utility in the post–Cold War period have faded, at least for the 
time being, as leaders ponder what Russian leader Vladimir Putin will do next to 
challenge the alliance� This uncertainty weighs heavily on the heads of state and 
government of NATO’s twenty-eight members�1 NATO Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen characterized the situation well when he wrote, “In these turbu-
lent times NATO must be prepared to undertake the full range of missions and to 
defend Allies against the full range of threats�”2
These are indeed turbulent times� But this is not a novel situation for the alli-
ance� Since its 1949 founding, NATO has experienced and survived many crises, 
including those in Berlin in 1958 and 1961, the Multilateral Force debate after the 
Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles in the 1980s� With the end of the Cold War, NATO confronted another 
crisis: one of confidence�
Our central argument is that the transatlantic relationship is challenged by 
not only Russia’s Machtpolitik actions in Crimea and Ukraine but also the rise of 
China and the lack of a shared security identity between the United States and 
major NATO members� The deleterious conse-
quences of China’s rise are discerned increasingly 
well from Washington� As a result of Beijing’s rise 
and the U�S� strategic rebalancing to Asia to reas-
sure allies there and deter potential aggression, 
Europe is less important to the United States than 
R
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it was during the Cold War�3 Yet a strong U�S� commitment to NATO remains 
important precisely because of the expansion of China’s capabilities and the risk 
it poses to NATO�4
The consequences for NATO of the rise of China must be analyzed to identify 
policy solutions that will prevent a decline in the transatlantic alliance� To con-
tribute to this objective, we review the major military, political, and normative 
aspects of the NATO alliance and argue that an explicit “Norms and Principles” 
component within NATO should be created to reinforce Western identity so as to 
help the organization remain unified in the face of a rising China�
Our argument is significant for two reasons� First, the rise of China has the 
potential to drive the transatlantic alliance apart� This is only in part because the 
United States increasingly is focused on China as a hegemonic threat� Before Rus-
sia’s invasion of Ukraine, the U�S� commitment to NATO was under strain as a 
result of the Obama administration’s reorientation to confront the rise of China�5 
Russia’s actions have given the United States pause, and Washington is laboring 
to increase its presence in Europe while doing the same in Asia� In contrast, many 
in Europe view China not as a threat but as an increasingly sophisticated market, 
trading partner, investor, and lender� Generally, European capitals seek to main-
tain excellent relations with Beijing�6 Should this divergence continue to grow, it 
could place the United States and Europe at strategic loggerheads�
Second, a basic tenet of strategy is to divide your adversary from its allies and 
even win those allies over to your side� Thus, strategists should expect that China 
will seek to divide the West, if China’s rise continues and security competition 
intensifies�7 A United States allied with Europe is a far stronger competitor than a 
United States divided from major European allies, who may remain observers or 
de facto neutrals in a Sino-American crisis� Accordingly, as Sino-American secu-
rity competition increases, it is reasonable to expect that China will try to divide 
the United States from key NATO members through diplomatic and economic 
means� Members of the transatlantic community should anticipate this challenge 
and be prepared to meet it� In doing so, the normative aspect of the alliance can 
play a key role�
NATO AS A MILITARY ALLIANCE
NATO’s historical role as a military alliance was to deter attacks on its members 
and defend them if necessary� NATO was spectacularly successful in this during 
the Cold War, and we submit that this should not change—NATO’s military role 
remains significant�
Historically, NATO was designed as a military alliance to protect security, and 
it has been most effective and successful in performing this difficult task for over 
forty years�8 Indeed, NATO has proved to be one of the most successful alliances 
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in history�9 It served as an instrument to build sustainable security on the inter-
governmental level� The key objective was to contain the Soviet threat� NATO 
provided the security umbrella under which European states were able to bury 
ancient hatreds and unite against a common threat�
With the end of the Cold War, the complicated and rather messy institutional 
security frameworks—not only NATO, but also the World Trade Organization, 
Western European Union, European Community, and Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe—were the result of a correlation of military, politi-
cal, and economic efforts designed to advance European security in an evolving 
world� But despite the proliferation of new institutions and alliance missions, 
the central military concern over Russia never went away� The principal military 
role of the alliance remained to secure members, especially new member states 
on Russia’s periphery, against the Russian threat� Events in Estonia in 2007, in 
Georgia in 2008, and against Ukraine today demonstrate that the concern over 
the actions of Putin’s Russia is significant, and thus NATO’s military mission 
should remain in place�
NATO AS A POLITICAL ALLIANCE
NATO is also an alliance, so it is a political creature� As with its military role, we 
argue that this should not change� In essence, the political problems during the 
Cold War were threefold�
The first major challenge for the alliance was to incorporate West Germany 
into the alliance, despite a legacy of tremendous resistance to German rearma-
ment, particularly by the French�10 The hatred and fear directed toward Germany 
were unparalleled and served as a source of tension within the alliance�
The second challenge was to maintain the coherence and unity of the alliance 
whenever a significant alliance member chose to leave its military structure or 
to select neutrality� This was a central concern of Washington in the case of West 
Germany� As diplomatic historian Marc Trachtenberg argues, the fear that West 
Germany would accept a Soviet offer of unification in return for German neu-
trality was considerable in the 1950s and again with the appeal of Gorbachev in 
the mid- and late 1980s�11 Yet France was a major concern in this respect as well� 
De Gaulle’s 1966 decision to remove France from the military structure of the 
alliance but remain within the political structure was a major, albeit temporary, 
crisis for the alliance�
The third challenge was the fundamental question of the credibility of the 
U�S� commitment to maintain a robust, extended deterrent in the face of the 
growth in military power of the Warsaw Pact, particularly after the 1968 inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia, and the continuation of the buildup in conventional and 
nuclear forces into the 1970s and 1980s� U�S� credibility also fluctuated owing to 
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strategic setbacks the United States encountered, especially the fall of Saigon in 
1975 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979� The degree to which such events might 
have emboldened the Soviet Union is less significant than the perception among 
NATO members that the U�S� commitment to NATO was weakening� Reassur-
ing the Europeans—in the face of the ups and downs of political debates in the 
United States; concern over U�S� decline with relation to a rising Japan; and the 
significant, threatening Soviet buildup—was a substantial task�
In the post–Cold War period, the political situation is positive� Germany is 
unified and a core member of the alliance� Moreover, since 2009 France has once 
again been participating fully in the military command structure of the alliance� 
In addition, the extended deterrent of the United States is not questioned in the 
manner it was during the Cold War� Yet despite these improvements, the alliance 
confronts major political problems� First, the United States is a hegemon in rela-
tive decline in relation to China and, as a result of China’s economic and military 
growth, U�S� military resources and political attention are increasingly drawn to-
ward Asia� This generates concern within the alliance, especially as Russia under 
Putin has taken a more belligerent course�12
These concerns are significant now, and have the potential to become worse 
in the future, as they are the seeds out of which might grow a “decoupling” of 
the alliance� All else being equal, a tight coupling of NATO’s military capabilities 
and political intent augments the alliance’s deterrent capability and its political 
health� The threat from Russia is not the threat from the Soviet Union, to be sure� 
However, the lopsided nature of the threat from China—an increasing threat to 
the United States and its interests but a far lesser threat to European states—does 
introduce the potential for divergence�
Within the alliance, perceptions vary considerably regarding the threat China 
poses� For example, May-Britt Stumbaum, an expert on the European Union 
(EU)–China relationship, argues that, “given their significantly different global 
outlooks, the United States and the European Union differ fundamentally in their 
perceptions of China’s rise�”13 She submits that
Europe does not and will probably never share the United States’ hard power perspec-
tive on Asia-Pacific� The U�S�’ rebalancing to Asia-Pacific was spurred by strategic 
military consideration and is seen in an economic view only secondarily� � � � For the 
Europeans, and particularly Germany, the Asia-Pacific region and the relationship 
with China is shaped by the “tyranny of distance,” with Russia in between consum-
ing most of the strategic thinking and resources that Germany and Europe entertain 
eastward�14
Moreover, some European analysts, like Chinese ones, tout the importance of 
multipolarity in global politics, and the necessity for strategic cooperation in 
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the EU-China relationship�15 For instance, Gustaaf Geeraerts asserts that, “as [a] 
consequence of increased international engagement and increasing economic in-
terests abroad, Europe and China are geopolitically more proximate than ever be-
fore�”16 As these arguments suggest, this introduces the possibility that a wealthier 
and more prominent, powerful, and assertive China will be able to entice some 
European states into passivity, or even neutrality, in the event of a Sino-American 
crisis or confrontation�
NATO AS A NORMATIVE ALLIANCE
Although the normative component may be overlooked, given the traditional 
emphasis on the other two responsibilities, NATO has always incorporated this 
aspect� Among its members, the alliance advanced political principles regarding 
individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and due process and the rule of law� 
NATO represented political norms as much as it did military power, and these 
norms provided a stark contrast to oppression within the Soviet bloc�
NATO’s normative component advanced four major objectives:
• It defined national security and united alliance members�17 It served as the 
ultimate reason for the struggle with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact� 
Freedom and human rights were legitimate and superior to totalitarianism, 
and had to be defended against threats�
• It defined what the alliance was and was not: normatively, NATO was the op-
posite of the Warsaw Pact—a bastion of freedom opposed to tyranny�
• It provided a standard against which the domestic politics of member states 
would be measured�
• It served as a weapon to undermine the legitimacy of communism in the 
minds of the Soviet peoples, Soviet allies, and others worldwide, just as the 
Soviets attempted to undermine NATO� 
The normative content was not fixed but evolved to include opposition to racism 
and strongly nationalistic political sentiments, with all components remaining 
important�
Of course, the alliance was not perfect in its adherence to these norms dur-
ing the Cold War or after� NATO sided with many authoritarian governments 
with dismal human rights records� Yet it is equally true that at different times 
in the course of the Cold War the alliance exerted significant pressure on Spain 
to democratize, and it helped to stabilize the relationship between Greece and 
Turkey�18 The alliance worked to establish stable civil-military relations and to 
professionalize the militaries of these countries� It worked to foster democratic 
norms in these cases, as well as in the post–Cold War era� It has had considerable 
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success in transforming NATO from an alliance composed of a mix of authoritar-
ian and democratic governments to a fully democratic alliance�19
While NATO is a military and political alliance, it is also a Western alliance, so 
one of its aims is to protect and advance shared Western values and norms� With 
the end of the military and political threat from the Soviet Union, NATO had an 
opportunity to place greater emphasis on Western identity and values� The role 
of NATO evolved toward a “European security identity�”20 In essence, this identity 
meant supporting democracy in aspiring members� Indeed, to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, “democracy” meant membership in the Western al-
liance and their commitment to accept its values and norms� As during the Cold 
War, the alliance proved to be not only a military institution but a democratic 
political organization as well, one that supports “a set of values that run counter 
to military nationalism, chauvinism, and racism” by promoting a military that is 
characterized by subordination “to elected officials, parliamentary control over 
defense budget[s], civilian expertise throughout the military-security apparatus, 
and respect for human and civil rights among conscripts�”21
These democratic standards were also evinced in the “Study on NATO En-
largement” of 1995�22 The document illuminated core principles and norms for 
each country joining the alliance during the three rounds of enlargement after 
the Cold War� It defined requirements applicable to future members of NATO 
(even though it avoided an explicit formulation)� The main requirements were 
four: (1) a stable, democratic political system; (2) support of the population for 
the country’s accession to NATO; (3) military readiness; and (4) elimination of 
all unresolved territorial disputes with neighboring countries, and strengthening 
of integration tendencies�23
The study’s overall emphasis was on political rather than military criteria, and 
political readiness for accession to NATO was also given increased attention in 
the three rounds of expansion occurring in 1999, 2004, and 2009� Certainly, the 
common threat from the USSR created NATO in 1949� However, well before the 
demise of the Soviet Union, Europe and the United States shared democratic 
values, a security identity, and institutional ties that bound them� Both sets of 
factors—military power and values—will help to shape and sustain the future of 
transatlantic relations in conjunction with other factors, including perceived in-
terests and threat assessments� Europe and the United States have much more in 
common with each other than with any other major powers in the world� Indeed, 
when we reflect on the alliance’s history, we can see that NATO has always had 
an important normative component� NATO’s “normative pillar” has weathered 
many “normative storms,” just as have the military and political pillars�24 Yet, in 
the present period, as NATO faces the profound challenge of the rise of China, 
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the normative component will play an even larger role: as the cement for the 
alliance�
THE RISE OF CHINA AND ITS IMPACT ON  
THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE
Whether China and the United States are destined to compete for domination 
in international politics is one of the major questions facing practitioners of 
that discipline� The answer depends to a large degree on whether China will be 
accommodated within the international system led by the United States or will 
seek to compete with the United States, resulting in intense security rivalry be-
tween Beijing and Washington� While there are excellent arguments in favor of 
the former position, our study assumes that the future of the relationship will be 
confrontational�25
We recognize that China’s impressive economic growth is slowing, in part ow-
ing to the 2015–16 collapse of the stock market, but that it nevertheless remains 
positive� China will become an economic superpower; but Beijing does have 
serious economic problems, such as increasing resource scarcities, pollution, and 
other environmental destruction, as well as ubiquitous corruption, a collapse of 
trust in personal and commercial relationships, and gross disparities in income 
and regional development� Huge inefficiencies and losses are likely to result in a 
leveling off of China’s economic growth�26
Although our argument is not deterministic, we are pessimistic about the 
future of the Sino-American relationship because of structural and domestic 
factors� Briefly, there are five major reasons for despair when we consider the 
likelihood of Sino-American security competition�27
First, China has numerous border disputes in the South and East China Seas 
and with India, and of course there is tension with Taiwan� Each of these conflicts 
is dangerous, particularly those in the South China Sea, owing to the perceived 
national security interests of Beijing, Washington, and allies, including the risk 
of intentional or inadvertent escalation�28
Second, we must consider Beijing’s and Washington’s conflicting grand stra-
tegic interests� The world has witnessed China’s abandonment of Deng’s Twenty- 
Four-Character Strategy and his talk of a “peaceful rise” in favor of rapid military 
expansion and what can only be described as a strategic autism, or tone deafness, 
that has alarmed Australia, Japan, India, and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations states, to the benefit of the United States� Unfortunately, unless Beijing 
changes its trajectory, it is on a collision course with Washington� The United 
States faces an increasingly hostile China, a fact that is regularly on display in the 
East and South China Seas and in international forums�29 China’s actions over the 
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last few years have been increasingly bold, including in its abandonment of any 
apparent concern over consequences�
Third, the systemic problems of alliances, mutual concerns over credibility, 
buck-passing, “chain ganging,” and abandonment confront the United States 
within the explicit or de facto alliances it maintains with Japan, India, and the 
Philippines (the relationship with Vietnam is warming as well)�30 Positive rela-
tions with these states provide prodigious benefits, but also introduce pathways to 
conflict with China, such as by emboldening an ally to take precipitous action�31
Fourth, there are structural causes of conflict� The classic problems of interna-
tional politics stem from anarchy; that condition intensifies the security dilemma 
and contributes to spirals of misperception� The world has witnessed increased 
Chinese demands; until recently they have been largely economic, but increas-
ingly are political and territorial, particularly in the East and South China Seas� 
Such demands cause a reaction in Washington�32 This provokes a response from 
China—and thus starts a spiral of increased tension, greater mutual suspicion, 
and more-intensive security competition�
Fifth, at the domestic level, even if the Chinese leadership wants to present a 
peaceful stance, its ability to do so will be jeopardized by domestic changes in 
China� According to Susan Shirk, given the lessons the Communist Party took 
from Tiananmen—avoid public splits, suppress popular movements, keep the 
People’s Liberation Army on the party’s side—today’s increasingly virulent na-
tionalism, spreading mass protests, and availability of information through the 
Internet and commercial media may destabilize China by provoking a reaction 
from the deeply insecure Chinese leadership�33
We do recognize that responsible Chinese leadership may find an avenue by 
which to avoid confrontation with the United States and Japan�34 However, work-
ing against this possibility is a motivation for conflict that is rooted in an internal 
fragility resulting from the leadership’s need to prove to the public, the military, 
the internal security agencies, and indeed China’s leaders themselves that they 
are staunch defenders of national pride and sovereignty�35 Thus, to back down in 
a crisis would entail considerable risk for the regime� Moreover, should internal 
destabilization occur, perhaps as a result of economic inequality or a push for 
greater liberalization, the risk of war with the United States and other powers 
would greatly increase� Any such crisis always brings with it the increased pos-
sibility of misperception, as well as a heightened fear that foreigners may exploit 
domestic instability to destabilize the country�
Stefan Halper argues that the threat China poses is greater by far than has 
been recognized�36 The threat is not just a military or economic one; it arises also 
from a new market-authoritarian model, one that provides both rapid growth 
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and stability, and thus the promise of a better quality of life� Absent are Western 
freedoms, including the possibility of political plurality or opposition�
China’s modernization has provided the most compelling demonstration of 
how to liberalize economically without surrendering to liberal politics� China’s 
success has provided three major advantages to China� First, China undermines 
American power and Western economic institutions� Second, as a matter of ideo-
logical struggle, China is also seen as a success—a rising economic and military 
power—in contrast to a United States in relative decline� Third, China’s success 
assists with building alliance relationships, and gives developing countries and 
emerging markets the freedom to deny Western conditions of financial engage-
ment� For example, China provides states in economic crisis, such as Angola, 
Cambodia, Chad, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela, with an 
alternative to following the dictates of Western institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank� Beijing’s creation in late 2015 of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was a major step in that direction� Also, 
such countries no longer must choose between emulating the Western model and 
rejecting capitalism, because China provides a model of market-based economic 
development and modernization paired with authoritarianism�
To Halper’s concerns we would add that China’s rise carries with it the explicit 
rejection of fundamental Western norms held by NATO members� While many 
violations of Western norms in the realm of human and civil rights occur within 
China, of particular importance today is the lack of a strong culture of antiracism� 
In his exceptional study of contemporary China, Martin Jacques writes that 
“there is a widely held view, not least in East Asia, that racism is a ‘white problem’: 
it is what white people do to others� In both China and Taiwan, the official posi-
tion is that racism is a phenomenon of Western culture, with Hong Kong holding 
a similar view� This is nonsense�”37 Jacques notes the ubiquity of racism in China: 
“All peoples are prone to such ways of thinking—or, to put it another way, all 
races harbour racial prejudices, engage in racist modes of thought and practice 
racism against other races� Racism, in fact, is a universal phenomenon from 
which no race is exempt, even those who have suffered grievously at its hands�”38
Racial discrimination arising in a potentially unstable empire with an em-
battled Communist Party could have grave consequences for regional stability in 
Asia� Moreover, in China we see the resurrection of the ideal of a racially based 
state through the myth of a Chinese people of the same race, blood, and culture� 
The myth of descent from the Yellow Emperor is the basis of a racial nationalism 
and xenophobia that submits that there are primal biological and cultural bonds 
among the Chinese that cannot be altered�39 These bonds compel a common 
adherence to state patriotism and nationalism� The Chinese are said not only to 
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share a common ancestry but also to derive from progenitors who, in the distant 
past even before the reign of the Yellow Emperor, separated themselves from 
non–East Asians, thus becoming the “core of the yellow race�”40
For M� Dujon Johnson, an African American sinologist who lived for many 
years in China, Chinese racism is endemic—such an obvious aspect of life that 
the fact of its existence is not worth discussing: “In Chinese society one of the 
reasons that the issue of race and racism is rarely discussed openly � � � is because 
racism is universally accepted and justified behind the veil of Asian cultural val-
ues�” He continues, “[T]hose who hold these views consider � � � [Chinese] cultural 
perspectives of other ethnic groups to be unassailable no matter how inaccurate 
or offensive they may be�”41 Johnson states that his experiences have demon-
strated to him “on a daily basis how life in Chinese society is racially segregated 
and in many aspects similar to a system of racial apartheid�”42
While the growth of Chinese power will have many positive elements for the 
Chinese, and perhaps for the global economy, it is unfortunate for the advance-
ment of human rights in international politics that China remains authoritarian, 
with discriminatory beliefs still accepted in the public sphere� The growth of 
Chinese power is inextricably linked to an ideology that does not share NATO’s 
concern for individual freedoms, human rights, and antiracism, and thus is a 
major normative challenge to the West�
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO: WESTERN VALUES IN THE FACE 
OF CHINA’S RISE
NATO has confronted threats before, but the rise of China is unlike any previous 
challenge� To a considerable degree, this is because there is gross disparity among 
alliance members in their views of the threat Beijing poses� In Washington and 
among Asia-Pacific allies, there is growing awareness of the adverse geopolitical 
consequences of the rise of China� At the same time, for European alliance mem-
bers the rise of China is a positive economic development and does not represent 
a security threat�43 This is evident from the recent trends in the EU-China rela-
tionship, particularly Chinese investment in the EU� As Nicola Casarini writes: 
“Since the advent of the financial crisis, the eurozone has been experiencing a 
massive surge in outbound direct investment by Chinese firms—a trend that 
is likely to accelerate in the future, as the debt crisis provides big investors with 
lucrative opportunities�”44 She continues:
In March 2012, the Chinese government also injected $30 billion into the China In-
vestment Corporation (the Chinese sovereign wealth fund) to be used specifically for 
acquiring industrial and strategic assets in Europe � � � [while] the “strategic partner-
ship” launched in 2003 has also become highly institutionalised: alongside an annual 
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EU-China summit and HED [High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue] there is 
now an EU-China High-Level Strategic Dialogue � � � [that organizes discussion along 
specific topics:] political dialogues, economic and sectoral dialogues (of which there 
are now more than 80), and people-to-people dialogues�45
This situation opens an avenue for China to divide the Western alliance� 
China is likely to do so because in a confrontation with the United States, China 
will want to weaken the United States by isolating it from as many of its allies as 
possible� This is unlikely to be accomplished in East or South Asia, because of 
the threat China’s rise poses for the countries there� However, China is not usu-
ally perceived as a direct threat to Europe� As Oliver Bräuner, a researcher at the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, argues, “China is generally 
not regarded as a military threat� The EU and its member states do not have any 
direct hard security interests in the Asia-Pacific region� Europeans have not fol-
lowed the United States in its so-called pivot (or rebalancing) to Asia that was 
announced by the Obama administration in October 2011”; “the EU and its 
member states remain very much focused on security threats originating from 
its immediate neighborhood, namely, the Middle East, Northern Africa, and, 
to a certain degree, Russia�”46 In Bräuner’s assessment, the “EU-China relation-
ship continues to be dominated by the economic interests of individual member 
states, both in trade and increasingly in investments� Furthermore, owing to a 
lack of direct security interests in the Asia-Pacific, Europeans do not generally 
see China as a security threat or a strategic competitor,” and so “the EU has so far 
failed to develop a strategic approach toward the potential security implications 
of transfers of European militarily sensitive technologies that goes beyond the 
existing arms embargo and currently lacks effective mechanisms to control the 
flow of such technologies to China�”47
Consequently, China will have every incentive over time to grow its economic, 
political, cultural, and social ties in Europe in an effort to supplant the United 
States as the major partner of European states� Clearly, this effort will be less 
successful in a country such as Great Britain that has a “special relationship” 
with the United States� It also will be less enticing for NATO members along the 
Russian periphery that are heavily dependent on NATO’s military commitment� 
However, for many European states, particularly those that are heavily indebted, 
China’s wealth might make China a more valuable ally than the United States�48 
First, China will be a significant potential lender for European states, and Bei-
jing’s importance in this role will only grow as European debt increases� Second, 
China will be able to capitalize on anti-American sentiment� Third, as it does 
today, China will be able to serve as a critical market for European goods as well 
as a manufacturing source for European industries and consumers� Fourth, we 
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should expect China to be very creative in its efforts to gain influence and in its 
messaging to targeted states� The confluence of these factors means that some 
NATO members may be gradually but increasingly drawn away from active sup-
port for the NATO alliance� Accordingly, we should recognize that Europe might 
become a zone of competition between the United States and China�
In response, NATO must strengthen its normative component that serves not 
only as a common bond uniting alliance members but as an enforcement compo-
nent as well� As noted earlier, the NATO alliance’s normative aspect had a power-
ful effect on its members during the Cold War and afterward� NATO will depend 
on that normative aspect once again as an enforcement mechanism to ensure not 
only that alliance members do not align with China but equally importantly that 
they recognize that China violates fundamental Western norms and therefore is 
unacceptable as a strategic partner�
Ideally, the United States would be able to maintain the alliance through a 
common perception of both threat and normative considerations� However, as 
this study has emphasized, alliance members are unlikely to share a common 
threat perception (although some NATO allies are alarmed at China’s actions 
in the South China Sea), so the normative component will be particularly im-
portant� And the normative aspect should not be underestimated, particularly 
regarding its influence on European states, which place considerable emphasis on 
the normative elements of international politics�49 This may provide a foundation 
on which NATO can build a unified Western response to the rise of China�
To that end, we advocate that NATO consider creating a “Norms and Prin-
ciples Committee” to advance two broad objectives:50
The first is to ensure that all current and prospective alliance members abide 
by the political norms and principles necessary to ensure that the alliance as a 
whole is animated by the right ideology� An alliance such as NATO does not 
constitute simply a response to a threat� It serves as a major political, military, 
and normative force in the transatlantic area� Its normative power is significant—
sufficient to ensure that the alliance promotes its shared norms, which serve to 
illuminate its differences from authoritarian governments in China and Russia�
Second, such a committee would be able to advance these values beyond the 
present alliance membership� Building on steps the alliance already takes with 
prospective members, establishing a “Norms and Principles Committee” would 
underscore the importance of adherence to political liberty and human rights, 
not only as a condition for membership, but as a guidepost for potential partners, 
such as Japan, India, other U�S� allies, and even current adversaries around the 
world�
Despite the difficulties in achieving respect for human and civil rights, there 
is a clear distinction between respect for these values in the West and in China� 
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The West has moved in the right direction, toward societies that are more open, 
tolerant, and inclusive; China has not� That stark difference between these so-
cieties reflects the divergent norms that animate the West in contrast to China, 
and it can serve in the future as NATO’s foundation as the alliance’s military and 
political roles shift in relative importance�
This study has explored the multifaceted implications for NATO, including its 
health as an alliance, of the rise of China� The military and political rationales 
for NATO remain sound, and our analysis should not be interpreted as an effort 
to detract from the importance of those aspects� This is especially so given the 
uncertainties represented by Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which remains a significant 
threat to NATO members and to stability in Europe�
At the same time, as we have stressed, the rise of China has the potential to 
damage greatly the transatlantic foundation of the alliance owing to the multi-
faceted nature of that rise and the dependence many modern economies have on 
China� To maintain the unity of the alliance, we urge that the normative element 
serve as the common thread, as it represents the starkest delineation between the 
West and China� The normative emphasis remains the surest foundation for the 
alliance in a time of divergent threat perceptions and conflicting interests�
In spite of having identified the risks China’s rise poses for the alliance, we 
fervently hope that the tension in the Sino-American relationship will decline 
in the future� While it is difficult at present to discern any immediate cause for 
such a reduction, perhaps some future liberalization in China will permit such 
an outcome� Indeed, in the event of political liberalization, NATO may become 
China’s greatest ally against Russia� The same normative interests that unite the 
transatlantic alliance may serve as an instrument of support should China un-
dergo democratization�
However, in the present lamentable situation, China and the United States ap-
pear headed for a clash; and in these circumstances the West must recognize that 
it is shared political principles that provide the foundation for its shared political 
system� Western nations have fundamentally transformed their societies in a 
positive direction, and they must recognize that fact� Aligning with a state—no 
matter how economically powerful—that explicitly rejects Western norms might 
arrest the progress of those norms, or even perhaps open the door to their rever-
sal, including in the West�
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